What influences the Changes in REIT CEO Compensation?: Evidence from Panel Data by John M. Griffith et al.
JRER  Vol. 33  N o . 2–2 0 1 1
What Influences the Changes in REIT CEO
Compensation? Evidence from Panel Data
Authors John M. Grifﬁth, Mohammad Najand, and
H. Shelton Weeks
Abstract This study examines what inﬂuences the changes in REIT CEO
compensation using the following performance measures:
average three-year total returns to shareholders, market value
added, Tobin’s q, and change in funds from operations. The
impact of managerial power on the change in compensation is
also examined. The empirical evidence indicates that ﬁrm
performance and size do not inﬂuence the change in CEO salary,
while risk, tenure, title, ownership, and age have signiﬁcant
impacts. Bonuses are not inﬂuenced by risk, size, or CEO power;
however, they are inﬂuenced by performance. Option awards are
affected by performance and CEO power.
Agency problems and costs arise because of the ‘‘separation of ownership and
control’’ of a corporation. Stockholders face two sources of agency problems.
First, partial ownership of the ﬁrm by managers may induce the managers to
consume non-pecuniary beneﬁts (perquisites) beyond those that a sole owner
would consume. The second problem is underinvestment (residual loss). Both are
costly and difﬁcult to solve. Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that as the owner
manager lessens her ownership, agency costs (monitoring, bonding, and residual
loss) increase monotonically. Boards of directors try to minimize these agency
problems through compensation contracts.
Executive compensation has been the subject of many studies. Most have focused
on industrial ﬁrms.1 Chopin, Dickens, and Shelor (1995) study real estate
investment trust (REIT) executive compensation and examine the inﬂuence board
structure has on the level of CEO compensation. They also examine the
relationship between the level of compensation of top REIT executives and
standard accounting measures, such as the change in revenue, total assets, net
income, EPS, and unexpected proﬁts. Hardin (1998) examines Equity REITs
(EREITs) and ﬁnds that size, number of years since the EREIT’s initial public
offering (IPO), dollar amount of dividends paid to senior executives and
percentage of stock owned by senior executives have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
the level of senior executive compensation. Scott, Anderson, and Loviscek (2001)
examine the impact of market-based performance measures on REIT executives’210  Griffith, Najand, and Weeks
total incentive compensation. Pennathur and Shelor (2002) examine the
relationship between changes in CEO compensation, speciﬁc performance
measures of the REIT industry, and stock returns. Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor
(2005) explore the association between REIT CEO stock-based compensation and
industry-speciﬁc performance measures. Gosh and Sirmans (2005) examine how
a board’s structure inﬂuences CEO compensation packages.
This study investigates whether the following inﬂuence the changes in REIT CEO
compensation: (1) CEO power (tenure, title, interlock relationship, and
ownership), (2) the size and complexity of the ﬁrm, (3) ﬁrm risk and CEO risk
aversion, and (4) ﬁrm performance.2 Four measures of CEO performance are
employed. The ﬁrst performance measure used is the average three-year total
return to shareholders (TR3YR). The next measure is market value added (MVA),
deﬁned as the difference between the market value of capital items and capital
invested. The third measure used is Tobin’s q. Although MVA and Tobin’s q are
used in the corporate ﬁnance literature as measures of managerial performance,
they have rarely been used in previous REIT research studies. The ﬁnal
performance measure is the change in funds from operations (CFFO), which is
used extensively in the REIT literature. The inﬂuences various REIT and CEO
characteristics have on the change of CEO compensation are also examined.
Five forms of REIT CEO compensation are used to examine the inﬂuences of
ﬁrm performance: (1) change in CEO salary (CSalary), (2) cash bonuses
(BONUS), (3) the change in CEO salary plus bonus (CTCC), (4) the change in
CEO total compensation (CTDC), and (5) stock options granted (BLKVAL).
Bonuses and option income are in themselves changes each year, that is, they can
be zero if a level of performance is not achieved. An unbalanced panel data set
is used to capture both the time-series and cross-sectional effects. Previous work
on REIT executive compensation has chieﬂy looked at compensation data on a
cross-sectional basis. The ﬁndings of this study reveal that performance and size
do not inﬂuence CSalary, while risk, tenure, title, ownership, and age have
signiﬁcant effects. Contrary to previous ﬁndings, BONUS is not inﬂuenced by
risk, CEO power, or size. Not surprisingly, BLKVAL is affected by ﬁrm
performance (TR3YR and CFFO). The awards are also inﬂuenced by CEO power
(tenure and title).
The following section presents a review of the REIT compensation literature and
the background for the paper. The data and methodology are discussed next,
followed by an analysis of the empirical results. The paper concludes with closing
remarks.
 Literature Review
The body of literature that examines various aspects of the REIT industry
continues to expand signiﬁcantly in terms of depth and breadth and there is an
abundance of research on executive compensation; however, there has been littleWhat Influences Changes in Compensation?  211
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work on REIT CEO compensation.3 Chopin, Dickens, and Shelor (1995) model
REIT executive cash-based compensation as a function of revenue and unexpected
proﬁts. They ﬁnd unexpected proﬁts and revenue are positively and signiﬁcantly
correlated with executive compensation when they group all executives.
Furthermore, their results show revenue and size are positively correlated with the
level of executive compensation. However, when they classify executives by ofﬁce,
they do not ﬁnd a consistent relationship between unexpected proﬁts or revenue
and the level of CEO compensation.
Hardin (1998), in his study of EREITs, is the ﬁrst to use measures of performance
speciﬁc to the REIT industry. The industry-speciﬁc variables he uses are the time
elapsed since the EREIT’s IPO, senior managements’ ownership, dividends paid
to executives, whether the executive founded the EREIT, and a dummy for the
property type. He ﬁnds size, number of years since the IPO, dollar amount of
dividends paid to senior executives, and percentage of stock owned by senior
executives inﬂuence the level of senior executive compensation. Conversely, he
ﬁnds that founder status and property type have no inﬂuence on the level of
executive compensation. He concludes that his ﬁndings highlight the need for
industry-speciﬁc compensation models. Scott, Anderson, and Loviscek (2001), on
the other hand, focus on incentive cash compensation. They carve out incentive
cash compensation by subtracting base compensation from total compensation.
They model incentive compensation as a function of total shareholder return, size,
time since the REIT’s IPO (age), and type of property managed. They ﬁnd market
performance has a signiﬁcantly greater impact on incentive compensation than
ﬁrm size. Speciﬁcally, incentive compensation is elastic to performance, but only
unit elastic to size. In contrast to the ﬁndings of Hardin (1998), their results
indicate that age does not inﬂuence executive compensation.
Pennathur and Shelor (2002) test the relationship between the change in CEO cash
compensation (CCCC) and the following: stock returns, changes in real estate
investment, change in funds from operations, CEO age, earnings per share,
whether the property is self-managed, and property type for the years 1994–1999.
For the years 1994–1996, they ﬁnd no relationship between CCCC and any of
their independent variables. They attribute this to the small sample size for the
period of study. They ﬁnd a positive relationship between CCCC and the previous
year’s stock returns for the years 1997–1999 and a negative relationship between
CEO age and CCCC. In addition, for this period they ﬁnd CCCC is not inﬂuenced
by earnings per share (EPS) or property type, regardless of whether the REIT is
self-managed. For the years studied, they also ﬁnd that prior years’ performance
signiﬁcantly inﬂuences CEO raises. Using the same performance and control
variables, Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor (2005) examine the relationship between
CEO stock-based compensation and stock returns, EPS, changes in real estate
investment, and changes in funds from operations. They use age, property
management, and property type as control variables and ﬁnd that CEOs receive
larger option awards when the REIT has greater growth opportunities, funds from
operation, and EPS. Further, they ﬁnd the riskier the REITs’ investments, as212  Griffith, Najand, and Weeks
measured by the variability of returns, the larger the CEO option awards.
Unexpectedly, they ﬁnd a negative relationship between option awards and REIT
stock performance and size. They suggest that the negative relationship between
option awards and stock performance is because REITs that suffer losses during
periods of high growth utilize larger stock option awards as a way of motivating
CEOs. Contrary to Pennathur and Shelor (2002), they ﬁnd that CEO age has no
inﬂuence on option awards. Similarly, Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) examine the
impact of board composition and monitoring on REITs’ performance. They ﬁnd
greater representation by external directors on REIT boards improves performance.
Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) ﬁnd that CEO compensation is higher when their
boards are weak and conclude that REIT board structure is ineffective in
monitoring CEOs.
A more recent study by Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2007) examines director
compensation by REITs. Their ﬁndings indicate higher equity-based compensation
for directors is positively related to higher ﬁnancial performance. While they show
a positive relationship between equity-based director compensation and the use of
an independent nominating committee, they ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship with
board size, use of outside directors, CEO duality, or CEO tenure and ownership.
Ertugrul, Sezer, and Sirmans (2008) examine corporate hedging activities by
REITs. They conclude that the CEO’s cash compensation and wealth sensitivity
to stock return volatility are signiﬁcant determinants of REIT derivative use.
Ghosh, Harding, Sezer, and Sirmans (2008) investigate the relationship between
the announcement of REIT stock repurchases and the use of managerial stock
options. They ﬁnd a positive relationship between managerial option holdings and
repurchase announcements.
This study expands this area of research by focusing on the REIT CEO pay-for-
performance relationship. Several important questions about the change in REIT
CEO compensation are addressed, including the question of how CEO ownership,
the number of positions held by the CEO, the size and complexity of the ﬁrm,
ﬁrm risk, and CEO performance affects the changes in the different types of
compensation.
 Data and Methodology
Data
The data for this study were obtained from four sources: (1) compensation and
return data from SNL Financial, (2) compensation data from Standard and Poor’s
ExecuComp database (2000–2006), (3) return data (stock market data) from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and (4) Standard and Poor’s
Research Insight. Compensation, ownership, and performance information was
obtained from SNL Financial for 232 REITs from 2000 to 2006, resulting in 1,624
observations. The ExecuComp database contains CEO compensation from theWhat Influences Changes in Compensation?  213
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Exhibit 1  Descriptive Statistics for REIT CEO Compensation, REIT Performance, Managerial Power, and
Control Variables
Variable Mean Min Max Std. Dev.
Salarya $387.68 0 $1,143.64 $211.85
BONUSa $459.24 0 $3,287.59 $473.61
TCCa $847.57 0 $3,841.23 $604.43
BLKVALa $402.734 0 $5,011.33 $719.57
TDCa $2,059.93 0 $38,253.41 $3,183.28
CSalary* $57.41 $103.48 $271.14 $233.08
CTCCa $479.93 $1,286.54 $1,823.61 $912.63
CTDCa $748.68 $3,201.17 $6,715.22 $1,087.38
TR3YR 19.14% 16.57% 102.64% 15.24%
MVAb $1,405.61 $376.82 $11,069.57 $1,683.17
Tobin’s q 1.19 0.69 5.34 0.88
CFFOb 29.87 39.54 1,002.36 43.91
Age 50.91 37 80 8.91
Tenure 8.87 1.29 43.20 7.47
Ownership 2.91% 0.01% 19.8% 4.31%
Total Assetsb $5,761.94 $308.11 $25,147.26 $4,791.34
Market Valueb $4,258.37 $203.24 $13,981.67 $2,943.81
Risk 1.49% 0.73% 4.92% 0.60%
Notes: TCC is the total current compensation comprised of salary and bonus; BLKVAL is the
aggregate real value of stock options granted to CEO; TDC is total compensation; CSalary is
change is salary; CTCC is the change in total current compensation comprised of salary and
bonus; CTDC is change in total compensation; TR3YR is the average three-year total returns to
shareholders; MVA is the ﬁrm’s market value added; Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value of
the ﬁrm’s equity and debt to the replacement cost of its assets; Risk is the standard deviation of
stock returns; and CFFO is the change in funds from operations.
aVariables are in thousands of dollars.
bVariables are in millions of dollars.
S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 ﬁrms. Data were gathered
for 57 CEOs for 48 REITs, resulting in an additional 234 observations (2000–
2006). Combining the data collected from SNL and ExecuComp resulted in 1,781
observations for 276 REITs. Those REITs with only one-year’s data available were
eliminated.
Exhibit 1 contains the descriptive statistics across all years for all the REITs in
the sample.4 Average CSalary, BONUS, CTCC, CTDC, and BLKVAL are $57,415,
$459,243, $479,926, $748,683, and $402,734, respectively.5 The average CEO’s214  Griffith, Najand, and Weeks
age (AGE), tenure, and percentage of ownership (%Own) are 51 years old, 9 years,
and 2.91%, respectively.6 The mean TR3YR, MVA, Tobin’s q, and CFFO of the
sample of REITs is 19.14%, $1.41 billion, 1.19, and 29.87 million, respectively.
The mean REIT size (Total Assets) is $5.76 billion and Average Market Value is
$4.26 billion.
Methodology
Five different deﬁnitions for the dependent variable, the change in CEO
compensation, are employed. The ﬁrst is the change in salary (CSalary) and the
second is CEO cash bonus (BONUS). BONUS is a one-time payment based on
the prior performance.7 Each year’s BONUS is independent of the prior year’s
BONUS,s oBONUS is used rather than change in BONUS. Next, CSalary plus
bonus (CTCC) is examined. The fourth deﬁnition is the most inclusive and is
equal to the change in salary, bonus, restricted stock granted, stock options
granted, long-term incentive payouts, and other (CTDC), which includes
perquisites, other personal beneﬁts, tax reimbursements, the difference between
the price paid for company stock and the market value of the stock for company
purchase plans not available to others, and certain deferred compensation. The
last deﬁnition is the value of stock options granted (BLKVAL) using the Black-
Scholes model to value these options. Similar to BONUS, BLKVAL is not
dependent on the prior year’s grant.8 Therefore, stock option grants are employed
rather than the change in BLKVAL. All numbers are adjusted for inﬂation, and as
a result, the unit of analysis is the yearly change in real compensation (the base
year is 2006). The individual must have been the CEO of the same company the
year before to be included in the data set. Therefore, an observation for the year
a person was promoted to CEO is not included.
The empirical model has changes in compensation as a function of: (1)
performance, (2) risk, (3) managerial power, and (4) control variables. The
following model is used to test the hypotheses:
CComp     Performance   Risk   MPower it 01 it12 it 3 it
  Controls  e , 4 it it
where:
CCompit  The change in compensation in year t for ﬁrm i;
Performanceit1  Performance of ﬁrm i in year t  1;
Riskit1  The standard deviation of stock returns in year t for ﬁrm i in
year t  1;
MPowerit  Managerial power of the CEO for ﬁrm i in year t; and
Controlsit  A vector of controls in year t for ﬁrm i (discussed below).What Influences Changes in Compensation?  215
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The measure of performance is multifold. The primary measure is average three-
year stockholder total returns (TR3YR). This measure makes the implicit
assumption that executives are rewarded not only for contemporaneous
performance but also for immediate past performance. Three-year returns were
chosen over one-year and ﬁve-year returns because TR3YR was found to have the
most signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the change in compensation. Market value added
(MVA) is used to see if there is a positive relationship between wealth
maximization and changes in compensation. MVA is deﬁned as the difference
between the market value of all capital items and capital invested. MVA measures
how much management has increased shareholders’ wealth. By maximizing MVA,
management is maximizing returns in excess of the cost of invested capital.
Tobin’s q9 is also used to measure managerial performance. By its construction,
Tobin’s q provides evidence of whether a ﬁrm’s management is making positive
net present value investments. Tobin’s q is the market value of the REIT divided
by the replacement cost of total assets. A marginal Tobin’s q of less than one is
an indication of over-investment (i.e., management has invested in negative net
present value projects). A Tobin’s q greater than one suggests that management
has made value-maximizing investments. The ﬁnal measure of performance is
change in funds from operations (CFFO). This measure is a cash-ﬂow surrogate
and has been used extensively in the REIT literature as a measure of performance.
Vincent (1999) ﬁnds that this measure of performance consistently provides
incremental information content. CFFO is expected to have a positive effect on
compensation. All deﬁnitions of the change in compensation are expected to be
positively related to performance. The empirical evidence on this relationship is
mixed. Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor (2005) ﬁnd a negative relationship between
option awards and stock performance, while Pennathur and Shelor (2002) ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant positive relationship between the CCCC and stock performance and
Scott, Anderson, and Loviscek (2001) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive relationship
between incentive cash compensation and stock performance.
Four measures for managerial power are employed. The ﬁrst, Tenure, is how long
an individual has been the company’s CEO. The presumption is that the longer a
person has served as CEO, the more power that person possesses. The second,
Title, a dummy variable, is used to indicate whether the CEO is also the chairman
of the board of directors. This serves as an indicator of a CEO’s ability to inﬂuence
compensation policies. The third, Interlock, is a dummy variable indicating
whether the CEO is involved in a relationship requiring disclosure in the
‘‘Compensation Committee Interlocks and Insider Participation’’ section of the
proxy statement. The last, PctOwn, reﬂects a CEO’s ownership of the ﬁrm. The
greater the CEO’s holdings, the more inﬂuence the individual may have over the
amount and type of compensation. Han (2006) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant non-linear
relationship between REIT insider ownership and REIT value. Thus, insider
ownership and the remaining proxies for power are expected to affect REIT value
signiﬁcantly and therefore, affect a CEO’s performance-based compensation.
Several REIT and CEO characteristics have been shown to have an impact on the
change in CEO compensation; thus, several control variables are employed. Since216  Griffith, Najand, and Weeks
the dependent variable is the change in compensation, the size (TASSETS) of the
ﬁrm is utilized as a control variable in the regressions. Size differentials may
reﬂect differences in executives’ abilities (Rosen, 1982; and Rose and Shepard,
1997). Larger ﬁrms’ CEOs might be expected on average to have greater changes
in compensation (Baumol, 1959). YEAR is to control for differences in economic
growth, compensation mix, and other potential changes over time. CEO age (Age)
is used as a control variable because it may affect a CEO’s attitude toward risk
(Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; and Smith and Watts, 1992). Age also serves as a
proxy for experience (Willis, 1985). It is also possible for Age and Tenure to serve
as a proxy for the age of the REIT. Therefore, if Age serves as a proxy for
experience or the age of the REIT, it should have a positive effect on CSalary.
The models were also run with and without property type dummies to control for
possible differences in the compensation between various types of REITs.
An unbalanced panel data set is employed in this study. This approach enables
the use of a large number of data points, increasing the degrees of freedom and
reducing collinearity among explanatory variables, thus improving the efﬁciency
of econometric estimates. Longitudinal data allow the analysis of a number of
important econometric questions that cannot be addressed using cross-sectional or
time-series data. Another major advantage of using panel data is that it provides
a means of resolving or reducing the effects of omitted or unobserved variables
that are correlated with explanatory variables in econometric models. For example,
the change in CEO compensation may be correlated with ability or other
unobserved variables. If ability and any other unobserved variables remain
approximately constant over short time periods, the use of panel data provides a
reasonable approach for addressing unobserved heterogeneity. Importantly, when
using panel data, a choice must be made between a random effects and ﬁxed
effects model. Using a random effects model requires the assumption that there
is no correlation between the individual effects. This can result in inconsistency
because of the inﬂuence of omitted variables. A ﬁxed effects model does not
require the assumption of no correlation between the individual effects. In
addition, the results of the Hausman Speciﬁcation Test show that a ﬁxed effects
model is appropriate.10 Therefore, a ﬁxed effects model is selected over the random
effects model for the panel data examined in this study.
 Results
The results for the different deﬁnitions of change in CEO compensation are
reported in Exhibits 2 through 6. All the models are signiﬁcant and have high
explanatory power. The results are unchanged by the inclusion or exclusion of
property type dummies.
Change in Salary
Exhibit 2 presents the results for CSalary. Previous work on REIT executives’
compensation does not segment out salary from total compensation or cashWhat Influences Changes in Compensation?  217
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Exhibit 2  Regressions
#1 2 3 4
Intercept 138.12 135.01 133.14 141.52









Risk 67.41 83.75 85.75 81.56
(2.15) (3.07) (3.63) (3.49)
Tenure 26.72 24.03 25.81 25.68
(3.02) (3.33) (3.39) (3.13)
Title 17.54 16.11 16.79 17.13
(2.97) (3.47) (3.39) (3.58)
Lock 51.89 59.89 47.43 55.43
(1.13) (1.37) (1.35) (1.19)
%Own 37.32 36.87 33.39 35.81
(2.89) (2.81) (2.84) (2.87)
Age 36.33 44.38 45.91 40.62
(2.73) (2.14) (2.51) (2.60)
Ten2 1.24 1.13 1.42 1.29
(3.84) (3.76) (3.74) (3.81)
%Own2 2.36 2.61 2.83 2.78
(3.14) (3.29) (3.71) (3.58)
Age2 0.29 0.44 0.48 0.39
(2.13) (2.17) (2.14) (2.17)
TAssets 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.17) (0.64) (0.91) (0.88)
2002 5.81 6.03 6.36 5.94
(0.49) (0.52) (0.57) (0.50)
2003 1.49 1.68 1.79 1.57
(0.24) (0.27) (0.30) 0.26
2004 5.81 6.34 6.71 6.03
(0.96) (1.09) (1.15) (1.02)
2005 4.58 4.86 4.94 4.62
(0.76) (0.84) (0.91) (0.81)
2006 14.11 14.24 14.62 14.37
(1.52) (1.57) (1.71) (1.67)218  Griffith, Najand, and Weeks
Exhibit 2  (continued)
Regressions
#1 2 3 4
Diversiﬁed 16.17 17.54 17.01 16.80
(0.24) (0.27) (0.32) (0.26)
Health Care 18.60 18.81 19.32 19.14
(0.28) (0.32) (0.37) (0.33)
Hotel 13.78 13.97 14.27 14.04
(0.21) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26)
Industrial 18.48 19.01 19.58 18.69
(0.28) (0.33) (0.39) (0.31)
Mall 17.77 18.25 18.61 17.93
(0.26) (0.31) (0.35) (0.27)
Ofﬁce 116.55 118.13 121.49 116.97
(1.26) (1.36) (1.45) (1.27)
Self-Storage 5.52 5.68 5.81 5.62
(0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08)
Manufactured Homes 9.88 10.01 10.21 9.91
(0.15) (0.17) (0.19) (0.15)
Multi-Family 11.80 12.34 12.62 11.87
(0.18) (0.22) (0.28) (0.19)
Specialty 12.68 12.91 13.08 12.74
(0.20) (0.23) (0.27) (0.22)
F 4.89 5.01 5.23 4.98
Adj. R2 67.13 68.04 68.71 67.89
Notes:
CSalary     Performance   Risk   MPower   Controls  f  t  e , it 02 it12 it 3 it 4 it Type it it
CSalary is the change in salary for CEOi in year t. Performance is measured by: TR3YR,t h e
average three-year total returns to shareholders; MVA is the ﬁrm’s Market Value Added; T’s q is
the ratio of the market value of the ﬁrm’s equity and debt to the replacement cost of its assets;
CFFO is the change in funds from operations. Risk is the standard deviation of stock returns.
Tenure is how long the person served as CEO. Title is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the
CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. Lock is a dummy variable where 1
indicates that the named ofﬁcer is involved in a relationship requiring disclosure in the
‘‘Compensation Committee Interlocks and Insider Participation’’ section of the proxy and 0
otherwise. %Own is the CEO’s percentage ownership of the ﬁrm. Age is age of the CEO. TAsset is
total assets and is used to control for size. fType are property type dummies. tit are time dummies
for years 2002–2006.What Influences Changes in Compensation?  219
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Exhibit 3  Regressions
1234
Intercept 181.12 180.41 133.52 174.23









Risk 122.36 155.83 181.75 156.31
(0.87) (1.41) (1.27) (1.46)
Tenure 0.93 23.78 6.88 19.83
(0.04) (0.67) (0.17) (0.45)
Title 241.32 92.03 113.94 98.46
(0.98) (0.48) (0.48) (0.51)
Lock 282.8 501.24 260.56 489.76
(1.41) (1.61) (1.21) (1.74)
%Own 35.13 39.62 1.87 43.87
(0.72) (0.73) (0.03) (0.68)
Age 61.69 41.81 41.81 43.52
(2.49) (2.14) (1.96) (2.31)
Ten 2 1.37 1.74 0.97 1.67
(0.81) (1.32) (0.53) (0.98)
%Own2 1.59 2.13 0.02 1.93
(0.39) (0.78) (0.00) (0.81)
Age2 5.64 3.92 3.74 3.88
(2.84) (2.14) (2.01) (2.27)
TAssets 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03
(0.59) (0.92) (1.16) (1.01)
2002 28.80 27.21 29.42 30.14
(0.47) (0.45) (0.52) (0.54)
2003 12.98 13.54 13.64 14.01
(0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.26)
2004 55.99 58.11 57.73 60.23
(0.93) (1.01) (0.98) (1.04)
2005 49.79 47.81 52.16 45.47
(0.83) (0.79) (0.94) (0.95)
2006 40.32 44.71 44.10 42.94
(0.67) (0.71) (0.69) (0.68)220  Griffith, Najand, and Weeks
Exhibit 3  (continued)
Regressions
1234
Diversiﬁed 180.93 157.39 173.25 164.37
(0.26) (0.20) (0.23) (0.22)
Health Care 206.18 223.95 214.51 218.76
(0.31) (0.36) (0.34) (0.35)
Hotel 75.43 70.54 72.39 77.81
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
Industrial 201.76 192.41 197.48 195.79
(0.31) (0.28) (0.30) (0.30)
Retail 195.09 203.52 198.48 201.64
(0.28) (0.32) (0.30) (0.31)
Ofﬁce 118.40 124.64 125.71 119.58
(0.78) (0.83) (0.84) (0.78)
Self-Storage 74.92 71.64 73.12 78.27
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Manufactured Homes 120.66 111.35 117.59 115.71
(0.18) (0.13) (0.16) (0.15)
Multi-Family 167.10 174.87 170.61 171.83
(0.23) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25)
Specialty 132.17 136.38 133.42 135.94
(0.20) (0.24) (0.22) (0.24)
F 2.37 3.36 2.33 3.08
Adj. R2 48.39 60.03 50.98 58.27
Notes:
Bonus     Performance   Risk   MPower   Controls  f  t  e , it 01 it12 it 3 it 4 it Type it it
Bonus is the cash bonus for CEOi in year t. Performance is measured by: TR3YR, the average
three-year total returns to shareholders; MVA is the ﬁrm’s Market Value Added; T’s q is the ratio of
the market value of the ﬁrm’s equity and debt to the replacement cost of its assets; CFFO is the
change in funds from operations. Risk is the standard deviation of stock returns. Tenure is how
long the person served as CEO. Title is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the CEO is also the
chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. Lock is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the
named ofﬁcer is involved in a relationship requiring disclosure in the ‘‘Compensation Committee
Interlocks and Insider Participation’’ section of the proxy and 0 otherwise. %Own is the CEO’s
percentage ownership of the ﬁrm. Age is age of the CEO. TAsset is total assets and is used to
control for size. fType are property type dummies. tit are time dummies for years 2002–2006.
t-statistics are in parentheses.What Influences Changes in Compensation?  221
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Exhibit 4  Regressions
1234
Intercept 492.81 598.16 367.46 556.48









Risk 14.84 36.28 33.14 38.47
(2.38) (2.73) (2.23) (2.49)
Tenure 22.56 46.15 34.17 41.64
(0.59) (1.05) (0.90) (1.02)
Title 112.41 114.37 104.83 107.91
(0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48)
Lock 126.54 210.53 164.93 186.52
(0.59) (0.98) (0.75) (0.84)
%Own 55.01 47.72 23.09 49.33
(1.12) (0.71) (0.36) (0.81)
Age 53.34 33.59 34.18 40.58
(2.41) (1.47) (1.51) (1.76)
Ten2 2.15 2.48 2.34 2.29
(1.71) (1.42) (1.19) (1.26)
%Own2 2.49 3.01 1.65 3.26
(0.83) (0.79) (0.44) (0.84)
Age2 4.84 2.93 2.81 2.97
(2.36) (1.46) (1.52) (1.94)
TAssets 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05
(0.68) (1.40) (1.21) (0.97)
2002 29.10 27.61 27.59 23.69
(0.47) (0.45) (0.45) (0.38)
2003 18.91 16.18 16.12 11.28
(0.31) (0.26) (0.26) (0.18)
2004 63.42 59.35 59.44 56.79
(1.05) (0.98) (0.98) (0.83)
2005 37.89 43.02 43.24 45.61
(0.62) (0.71) (0.71) (0.75)
2006 66.05 71.56 71.67 71.33
(1.09) (1.18) (1.18) (1.18)222  Griffith, Najand, and Weeks
Exhibit 4  (continued)
Regressions
1234
Diversiﬁed 178.78 181.82 184.05 170.34
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.25)
Health Care 239.21 242.28 244.28 229.02
(0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.34)
Hotel 103.32 94.94 97.15 78.47
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09)
Industrial 220.18 216.11 218.36 200.20
(0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.31)
Retail 217.15 217.90 219.28 204.22
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.29)
Ofﬁce 174.94 180.51 181.91 183.02
(0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Self-Storage 112.36 109.64 111.61 98.53
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12)
Manufactured Homes 90.61 89.03 91.72 74.83
(0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11)
Multi-Family 188.32 191.09 205.65 198.99
(0.26) (0.29) (0.31) (0.30)
Specialty 145.42 141.43 143.82 137.63
(0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21)
F 3.61 3.74 3.86 3.69
Adj. R2 55.97 63.24 57.18 59.82
Notes:
CTCC     Performance   Risk   MPower   Controls  f  t  e . it 01 it12 it 3 it 4 it Type it it
CTCC is the change in total current compensation comprised of salary and bonus for CEOi in year
t. Performance is measured by: TR3YR, the average three-year total returns to shareholders; MVA
is the ﬁrm’s Market Value Added; T’s q is the ratio of the market value of the ﬁrm’s equity and
debt to the replacement cost of its assets; CFFO is the change in funds from operations. Risk is the
standard deviation of stock returns. Tenure is how long the person served as CEO. Title is a
dummy variable where 1 indicates the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise.
Lock is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the named ofﬁcer is involved in a relationship
requiring disclosure in the ‘‘Compensation Committee Interlocks and Insider Participation’’ section
of the proxy and 0 otherwise. %Own is the CEO’s percentage ownership of the ﬁrm. Age is age
of the CEO. TAsset is total assets and is used to control for size. fType are property type dummies.
tit are time dummies for years 2002–2006. t-statistics are in parentheses.What Influences Changes in Compensation?  223
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Exhibit 5  Regressions
1234
Intercept 117.04 337.97 374.60 301.59









Risk 184.70 205.67 282.50 200.98
(0.92) (1.06) (1.58) (1.01)
Tenure 11.65 18.77 30.23 19.68
(0.22) (0.04) (0.64) (0.13)
Title 190.40 275.18 220.15 273.54
(0.60) (0.89) (0.77) (0.84)
Lock 174.41 449.00 120.98 481.82
(0.61) (1.50) (0.45) (1.58)
%Own 169.86 125.31 127.95 114.64
(2.06) (1.46) (1.96) (1.39)
Age 552.39 507.93 455.76 498.76
(1.71) (1.65) (1.62) (1.70)
Ten2 1.61 4.66 1.26 5.03
(0.06) (0.18) (0.53) (0.25)
Own2 8.34 5.73 6.60 5.23
(1.93) (1.14) (1.46) (1.26)
Age2 5.00 4.68 4.23 4.86
(1.72) (1.68) (1.66) (1.71)
TAssets 0.66 0.58 0.35 0.49
(1.41) (1.31) (0.94) (1.07)
2002 683.14 683.88 674.47 682.09
(1.05) (1.05) (1.03) (1.05)
2003 382.01 373.11 368.13 376.77
(0.59) (0.58) (0.57) (0.58)
2004 1,127.56 1,124.50 1,110.33 1,126.77
(1.76) (1.75) (1.73) (1.76)
2005 593.36 619.54 566.32 577.13
(0.92) (0.96) (0.88) (0.90)
2006 1,066.37 1,082.91 1,039.58 1,050.46
(1.66) (1.69) (1.62) (1.64)224  Griffith, Najand, and Weeks
Exhibit 5  (continued)
Regressions
1234
Diversiﬁed 460.37 515.82 496.74 464.31
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.72)
Health Care 486.14 585.93 517.14 510.47
(0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.79)
Hotel 702.20 702.02 779.20 831.82
(0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.13)
Industrial 967.13 845.47 1,191.70 1,252.09
(0.15) (0.13) (0.18) (0.19)
Retail 299.92 252.49 260.26 314.31
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Ofﬁce 346.79 380.27 356.71 348.95
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Self-Storage 245.27 264.72 235.64 246.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Manufactured Homes 96.16 175.15 171.76 164.91
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Multi-Family 186.40 184.85 214.81 204.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Specialty 174.76 240.17 218.93 233.16
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
F 2.54 2.18 2.84 2.21
Adj. R2 49.38 44.44 55.02 47.65
Notes:
CTDC     Performance   Risk   MPower   Controls  f  t  e . it 01 it12 it 3 it 4 it Type it it
CTDC is the change in total compensation for the individual year, comprised of the following:
Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options
Granted (using Black-Scholes), Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total for CEOi in year t.
Performance is measured by: TR3YR, the average three-year total returns to shareholders; MVA is
the ﬁrm’s Market Value Added; T’s q is the ratio of the market value of the ﬁrm’s equity and debt
to the replacement cost of its assets; CFFO is the change in funds from operations. Risk is the
standard deviation of stock returns. Tenure is how long the person served as CEO. Title is a
dummy variable where 1 indicates the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise.
Lock is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the named ofﬁcer is involved in a relationship
requiring disclosure in the ‘‘Compensation Committee Interlocks and Insider Participation’’ section
of the proxy and 0 otherwise. %Own is the CEO’s percentage ownership of the ﬁrm. Age is age
of the CEO. TAsset is total assets and is used to control for size. fType are property type dummies.
tit are time dummies for years 2002–2006. t-statistics are in parentheses.What Influences Changes in Compensation?  225
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Exhibit 6  Regressions
1234
Intercept 748.19 191.24 117.81 204.87









Risk 92.37 50.49 76.09 58.71
(0.58) (0.28) (0.33) (0.41)
Tenure 108.14 103.58 92.97 115.67
(2.33) (2.03) (1.97) (1.98)
Title 583.81 622.74 630.11 600.53
(2.01) (1.97) (1.89) (2.04)
Lock 1,386 1,528 1,483 1,621
(5.23) (4.99) (4.84) (5.03)
%Own 8.03 9.65 5.54 8.42
(0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08)
Age 187.58 123.82 126.78 125.34
(0.62) (0.46) (0.45) (0.56)
Ten2 4.93 4.87 4.29 4.95
(2.37) (2.14) (1.91) (2.09)
%Own2 1.19 1.06 1.01 1.08
(0.20) (0.19) (0.24) (0.22)
Age2 1.80 1.31 1.53 1.49
(0.69) (0.48) (0.52) (0.57)
TAssets 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.82) (0.20) (0.31) (0.25)
2002 603.89 617.76 614.57 628.10
(1.81) (1.85) (1.84) (1.88)
2003 445.02 466.38 459.10 479.61
(1.35) (1.42) (1.39) (1.45)
2004 1,021.49 1,048.95 1,035.62 1,059.83
(3.13) (3.22) 3.17 (3.25)
2005 1,156.00 1,210.94 1,166.42 1,222.56
(3.54) (3.71) (3.56) (3.74)
2006 1,631.88 1,683.20 1,643.12 1,693.92
(5.01) (5.17) (5.04) (5.20)226  Griffith, Najand, and Weeks
Exhibit 6  (continued)
Regressions
1234
Diversiﬁed 527.30 525.62 667.98 598.07
(0.13) (0.12) (0.17) (0.16)
Health Care 1,862.31 1,583.56 1,942.49 1,610.47
(0.48) (0.41) (0.50) (0.42)
Hotel 423.77 521.60 499.97 458.89
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Industrial 1,503.31 1,222.43 1,490.03 1,188.35
(0.39) (0.31) (0.39) (0.31)
Retail 417.31 433.65 543.97 346.30
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09)
Ofﬁce 1,366.59 1,111.24 1,207.60 1,519.86
(0.36) (0.29) (0.29) (0.39)
Self-Storage 321.98 127.47 328.63 194.02
(0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04)
Manufactured Homes 203.93 208.59 249.23 119.76
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
Multi-Family 583.28 598.07 620.87 754.86
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20)
Specialty 792.37 825.52 893.43 817.48
(0.21) (0.20) (0.23) (0.21)
F 3.71 2.59 2.92 2.63
Adj. R2 61.13 50.38 55.49 53.16
Notes:
BLKVAL     Performance   Risk   MPower   Controls  f  t  e , it 11 it12 it 3 it 4 it Type it it
BLKVAL is the aggregate real value of stock options granted to CEOi during the year t as valued
using Black Scholes methodology. The calculation of this ﬁgure takes into account the volatility of
the individual company. Performance is measured by: TR3YR, the average three-year total returns
to shareholders; MVA is the ﬁrm’s Market Value Added; T’s q is the ratio of the market value of
the ﬁrm’s equity and debt to the replacement cost of its assets; CFFO is the change in funds from
operations. Risk is the standard deviation of stock returns. Tenure is how long the person served as
CEO. Title is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the CEO is also the chairman of the board and
0 otherwise. Lock is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the named ofﬁcer is involved in a
relationship requiring disclosure in the ‘‘Compensation Committee Interlocks and Insider
Participation’’ section of the proxy and 0 otherwise. %Own is the CEO’s percentage ownership of
the ﬁrm. Age is age of the CEO. TAsset is total assets and is used to control for size. fType are
property type dummies. tit are time dummies for years 2002–2006. t-statistics are in parentheses.What Influences Changes in Compensation?  227
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compensation. First, the results show that lagged performance, no matter how
deﬁned, does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence CSalary. This result is not surprising since
CEOs might be compensated for performance in other ways. Riskiness of the ﬁrm,
how long the CEO has served, whether they served as both CEO and chairman
of the board, and their ownership position are found to inﬂuence CSalary. Firm
risk has a signiﬁcant, positive effect on CSalary.11 This may reﬂect differences in
the required ability of the CEO. As expected, the measures of Power, Tenure,
Title, and PctOwn have signiﬁcant positive effects on CSalary.12 These ﬁndings
suggest that as CEOs consolidate their power, they use it to inﬂuence the change
in their salaries. Thus, a potential agency problem is indicated. As expected, Age
has a positive effect on CSalary. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) ﬁnd that as CEOs
approach retirement, their salaries are boosted to raise retirement income. In
addition, if Age serves as a good proxy for experience, it should have a positive
effect on CSalary. The negative coefﬁcients for Tenure2, PctOwn2, and Age2 show
that Tenure, PctOwn and Age positively affect CSalary but at a decreasing rate.
The negative coefﬁcient for PctOwn2 suggests that at some level of ownership,
CSalary declines. The results indicate that neither property type nor length of
service affects CSalary.
Bonus
Exhibit 3 contains the results for BONUS. A bonus is normally paid as a reward
for performance above the norm, as well as independent of the prior year’s bonus
and is not cumulative. All models are statistically signiﬁcant and have high
explanatory power. First, all four deﬁnitions of performance have signiﬁcantly
positive inﬂuences on BONUS. This is as expected and in line with Scott,
Anderson, and Loviscek (2001). This ﬁnding also suggests that BONUS is a
reward for performance. Contrary to Scott, Anderson, and Loviscek, age has a
signiﬁcantly positive inﬂuence on BONUS, but ﬁrm size does not. The inﬂuence
of age on BONUS is consistent with age serving as a proxy for experience.
Alternatively, it could indicate that older CEOs require greater bonus
compensation to motivate them to make decisions that are consistent with
shareholders’ wealth maximization. The proxies for managerial power have no
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on BONUS. This is likely the result of CEOs using their
power to structure their compensation so that it includes a smaller risk-based
component. Although not shown in Exhibit 3, just as Hardin (1998) found, Time
(the year the bonus is awarded) is signiﬁcant, which leads to the conclusion that
the changes over the years 2000 through 2006 inﬂuenced BONUS.
Change in Cash Compensation
Exhibit 4 contains the results for CTCC. As before, all the models are signiﬁcant
and have high explanatory power. The results indicate ﬁrm performance and risk
impact CTCC. Surprisingly, MPowerit, Age, and Total Assets do not signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence CTCC. Age’s lack of inﬂuence contrasts with the Pennathur and Shelor228  Griffith, Najand, and Weeks
(2002) ﬁndings. The ﬁnding that Total Assets is insigniﬁcant also differs from
Chopin, Dickens, and Shelor (1995), Hardin (1998), and Scott, Anderson, and
Loviscek (2001). Again, as found by Hardin (1998), Time (the year of the
compensation) is signiﬁcant, leading to the conclusion that the changes over the
years 2000 through 2006 inﬂuenced CEOs’ CTCC.
Change in Total Compensation
Exhibit 5 contains the results for CTDC. Again, all the models are signiﬁcant and
have high explanatory power. As expected, Performanceit1 and %Own have
signiﬁcant positive effects on CTDC, and all four measures of performance are
signiﬁcant. Ownership is the only proxy for managerial power that has a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence, and its inﬂuence is increasing but at a decreasing rate. Thus,
it appears that CEOs are using their power to inﬂuence CTDC. The impact of Age
on CTDC is positive but marginal. This ﬁnding differs from Pennathur and Shelor
(2002), who ﬁnd that age has a negative inﬂuence. In contrast to previous studies,
size does not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence.
Option Awards
Lastly, Exhibit 6 contains the results for the total real value of stock options
granted during the year using Black Scholes option valuation methodology,
BLKVAL. Once more, all the models are signiﬁcant and have high explanatory
power. TR3YR (average three-year total returns to shareholders) and CFFO
(change in funds from operations) are the only measures of performance that have
a signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence on BLKVAL. One may interpret the ﬁnding that
option awards are driven by both the increasing of shareholders’ wealth and the
improvement operating performance. This indicates that option awards serve their
intended purpose of aligning the interests of management and shareholders. MVA
and Tobin’s q are insigniﬁcant. This is unexpected, because these measures are
indicators of shareholder wealth maximization and managerial performance, and
stock option awards are normally granted to reward managerial performance. The
ﬁnding of a positive relationship between BLKVAL and stock returns is consistent
with other studies (Hall and Liebman, 1998) and incentive income and stock
returns (Scott, Anderson, and Loviscek, 2001). The signiﬁcance of CFFO is in
agreement with Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor (2005). However, the ﬁnding of a
positive relationship between BLKVAL and stock returns contrasts with Pennathur,
Gilley, and Shelor. They conclude that their ﬁnding of a negative relationship is
because stock options are being awarded to better align CEO interest with that of
stockholders after the ﬁrm suffers losses. However, perhaps their conclusion is
time sensitive, as their sample time period is from 1997 to 2000, a period of
falling REIT returns. In contrast, the sample time period considered in this study
is 2000–2006, a period of positive and negative REIT returns. In addition, three
measures of managerial power—tenure, title, and interlock—have a signiﬁcantly
positive effect on BLKVAL. Thus, the more power the CEO has, the largerWhat Influences Changes in Compensation?  229
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BLKVAL. Risk and Total Assets do not have a signiﬁcant effect. This ﬁnding
implies that CEOs are not awarded options for investing in high-risk projects or
for simply increasing the size of the REIT. This differs with Pennathur, Gilley,
and Shelor’s (2005) conclusion.
 Summary and Conclusions
This study explores the change in REIT CEO compensation. Five different forms
of change in CEO compensation are considered: change in CEO salary, cash
bonuses, change in CEO salary plus bonus (change in total cash compensation),
change in CEO total compensation, and stock options granted. To capture the
determinants of the change in CEO compensation, the following performance
measures are employed: the average three-year total return to shareholders, market
value added, Tobin’s q, and the change in funds from operations. The impact of
managerial power on the change in compensation is also examined. A panel data
set is used to capture both the time-series and cross-sectional effects. All the
models are signiﬁcant and have high explanatory power.
The ﬁndings indicate that performance and size do not inﬂuence change in CEO
salary. Alternatively, risk, tenure, title, ownership, and age all affect change in
CEO salary. Thus, CEO power and experience have a signiﬁcant impact on the
change in CEO salary and as ﬁrm risk increases, more expertise is needed to
manage the REIT. As expected, performance and experience drive cash bonuses.
In contrast to expectations and previous studies, cash bonuses are not inﬂuenced
by risk, CEO power, or size. The change in total cash compensation is signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced by ﬁrm performance and risk. CEOs are rewarded for performance and
risk taking. Surprisingly, power, age, and size do not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the
change in total cash compensation. The latter ﬁndings are in contrast to those of
previous studies. Performance and ownership have signiﬁcant impacts on changes
in total CEO compensation, while age has a marginal effect. These results conﬁrm
that compensation committees consider REIT performance important when
deciding the CEO’s total compensation package.
The data show that CEO option awards are linked to stockholder returns. This is
similar to Hall and Liebman (1998) and Scott, Anderson, and Loviscek (2001),
who ﬁnd that option awards and incentive compensation are positively related to
stock returns. This ﬁnding is in stark contrast to Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor
(2005), who ﬁnd that option awards are inversely related to stock returns. Further,
the granting of stock options is affected by CEO tenure in ofﬁce, when they are
both CEO and chairman of the board, and when CEOs have interlocking
relationships that require disclosure. These ﬁndings suggest CEOs are using their
power to affect the granting of stock options. Contrary to Pennathur, Gilley, and
Shelor, the ﬁndings in this study do not indicate that ﬁrm risk inﬂuences grants
of stock options. Similar to Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor, size and age are not
found to affect the grants of stock options. The change in the different forms of
CEO compensation, except for change in CEO salary, is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced230  Griffith, Najand, and Weeks
by REIT performance. On a cautionary note, the signiﬁcance of the proxies for
CEO power may be an indication of the existence of agency problems.
 Endnotes
1 For a survey of the corporate literature see, Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003).
2 MVA and CFFO are correlated with Total Assets (size) but not signiﬁcantly. In addition,
the variance inﬂation factors between MVA and CFFO and Total Assets are 1.28 and
1.45 respectively, which indicates collinearity is not a problem. Additionally, Total Assets
was not signiﬁcant when the models were run with the MVA and CFFO excluded.
3 Surveys of the corporate compensation literature include Murphy (1999) and Core, Guay,
and Larcker (2003). More recent works in this area include Gius (2007) and Tzioumis
(2008). Evidence of the continued expansion of the existing REIT speciﬁc literature is
found in Sirmans, Friday, and Price (2006), Daniels and Phillips (2007), Ooi, Webb,
and Zhou (2007), and Hardin, Hill and Hoper (2009).
4 The correlation matrix indicated that some variables are signiﬁcantly correlated.
Subsequently, variance inﬂation factors were calculated to determine if multicollinearity
was a signiﬁcant problem within the model. None of the variance inﬂation factors
exceeded 1.5, indicating that multicollinearity is not adversely inﬂuencing the coefﬁcient
estimates.
5 The Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data and the Skewness/Kurtosis test for normality
were run for each year and for each form of compensation and normality was not
rejected at the 5% level.
6 Tenure and Age are signiﬁcantly correlated. However, the variance inﬂation factor for
the two variables is 1.42, indicating that collinearity is not a problem.
7 To verify that BONUS and BLKVAL are independent of the prior year’s BONUS and
BLKVAL, the regressions were run with BONUS and BLKVAL lagged as independent
variables and neither was found to be signiﬁcant.
8 The Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data and Skewness/Kurtosis test for normality were
run for each year and for each form of compensation and normality was not rejected at
the 5% level.
9 Tobin’s q is calculated using Han (2006).
10 Hausman test statistic: 
2  17,790.03.
11 Risk is the standard deviation of the ﬁrm’s stock returns of the previous year.
12 To investigate the presence of collinearity in the models, each predictor variable is
regressed against all others. The average R
2 is .20. Next, the relation between the
predictor variables was determined using the variance inﬂation factors (VIF). The
average VIF is 1.46. A VIF greater than 10 may be a signal of collinearity problems.
Thus, collinearity is not signiﬁcant.
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